The remarkable stability of low domestic inflation in many countries requires explanation. In this paper, a number of competing hypotheses are evaluated on a stand-alone basis, and all are found to be inadequate. This includes the view that this outcome has been solely the result of more effective disinflationary monetary policies. However, a combination of these hypotheses (including a significant role for increased global competition) seems to provide a plausible explanation, not only for continuing low inflation, but also its coexistence with rapid growth and low real interest rates. Unfortunately, the analysis also leads to the conclusion that rising inflation, unwinding financial imbalances, or both, could easily follow the welcome stability seen to date
No one in the industrial countries should now question the substantial economic benefits associated with reducing inflation from earlier, high levels. At the same time, history also teaches that the stability of consumer prices might not be sufficient to ensure macroeconomic stability. Past experience is replete with examples of major economic and financial crises that were not preceded by inflationary pressures. Conversely, history shows that many periods of deflation, based on rising productivity, were simultaneously characterised by rapid growth. Recent structural changes in the global economy imply that this history might have more contemporaneous relevance than is commonly thought. If so, the implication is that policies directed to the pursuit of price stability might have to be applied more flexibly and with a longer-run focus than has recently been the case
It is now six years since a devastating financial and economic crisis rocked the global economy. Supported strongly by the G20 process, international regulators led by the Financial Stability Board have been working hard ever since to develop new regulatory standards designed to prevent a recurrence of these events. These international standards are intended to provide guidance for the drawing up of national legislation and regulation, and have already had a pervasive influence around the world. This paper surveys recent international developments concerning the prudential regulation of financial institutions: banks, the shadow banking system and insurance companies. It concludes that, while substantial progress has been made, the global economy nevertheless remains vulnerable to possible future financial instability. This possibility reflects three sets of concerns. First, measures taken to manage the crisis to date have actually made the prevention of future crises more difficult. Second, the continuing active debate over virtually every aspect of the new regulatory guidelines indicates that the analytical foundations of what is being proposed remain highly contestable. Third, implementation of the new proposals could suffer from different practices across regions. Looking forward, the financial sector will undoubtedly continue to innovate in response to competitive pressures and in an attempt to circumvent whatever regulations do come into effect. If we view the financial sector as a complex adaptive system, continuous innovation would only be expected. This perspective also provides a number of insights as to how regulators should respond in turn. Not least, it suggests that attempts to reduce complexity would not be misguided and that complex behaviour need not necessarily be accompanied by still more complex regulation. Removing impediments to more effective self discipline and market discipline in the financial sector would also seem recommended.
Economic liberalization almost everywhere has constituted a positive supply shock which has been profoundly disinflationary at the global level. Financial liberalization in the industrial countries has also given fuller rein to inherent tendencies towards "procyclicality", a process of credit creation leading to asset price increases and heavy fixed investment which can amplify the business cycle. Monetary authorities in the industrial countries have generally been able to follow easier policies than otherwise given the absence of inflationary pressures. Monetary authorities in emerging market economies, particularly in Asia, have also eased in an attempt to offset the upward pressure on their currencies resulting from ease elsewhere. Given this combination of circumstances, there has been no systematic resistance to the financial sector's inherent tendencies to overreach. Adept countercyclical monetary policies have to date mitigated the potential economic costs of these imbalances. However, these policies have also had less welcome cumulative effects over time. The first is that nominal policy rates were ratcheted down very close to the zero nominal bound. This raises issues having to do with the potential for future policy responses in the event of further shocks threatening growth and employment. The second by-product has been that the financial imbalances have tended to grow ever larger. Consider the low level of saving in the United States, the current high level of fixed investment in China, rising house prices almost globally, and growing external imbalances as well. The paper concludes that the global economy does face exposures warranting a policy response. The challenge for domestic authorities looking forward is how the likelihood of a recurring imbalances might be reduced while still maintaining the benefits of financial liberalization. Two principles might underly such a domestic macrofinancial stabilization framework. First, we need closer cooperation between the domestic official agencies concerned about financial stability. Second, a more symmetric response from both monetary and regulatory authorities to the expansionary and contractionary phases of endogenous financial cycles might be suggested. In this regard, more attention needs to be paid to the source of disinflationary and even deflationary forces, since history indicates that they are not all equally dangerous. The parallel issue of whether we need a macrofinancial stabilization framework at the international level is also discussed. Unlike earlier international financial systems, there is no mechanism in the current "hybrid" system to prevent external imbalances from becoming so large as to threaten an eventual disorderly adjustment.